Sub-Saharan Africa’s engagement with emerging partners: opportunities and challenges by Samah S. A. Elmorsy
Sub‑Saharan Africa’s engagement 
with emerging partners: opportunities 
and challenges
Samah S. A. Elmorsy*
Background
Africa has a history of cooperation with the South. Its formal involvement in South–
South cooperation dates back to 1955 when African and Asian nations, most of them 
newly independent, held a conference in Bandung, Indonesia, to promote economic and 
cultural cooperation and bring an end to colonialism. The Bandung Conference called 
for the promotion of world peace and underscored the need for developing nations to 
reduce their dependence on industrialized countries by providing technical assistance to 
one another. Furthermore, the Bandung Conference provided inspiration and impetus 
for the development of various South–South alliances in the 1960s and 1970s. For exam-
ple, it led to the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. It also provided impe-
tus for the creation of the Group of 77 (G-77) during the first United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964. The G-77 has established itself as the 
leading voice of the South in the global arena. It has also played a lead role in establish-
ing a conceptual framework and guiding principles for South–South cooperation.
Abstract 
The aim of the paper is to analyze the economic impact of Sub-Saharan Africa’s (SSA) 
engagement with emerging partners (China, India and Brazil BICs) and to determine 
the opportunities and challenges of the increasingly engaging with the new partners. 
In order to achieve the aim of the paper it estimated the most effective variables that 
determine the trade intensity between SSA and Chinausing Gravity model approach. 
The paper concluded that the most important variables that have the major effect 
on the value of exports of Sub-Saharan Africa to Chinawere rate of mobile telephone 
in China (infrastructure variable) and China FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa because much 
of China’s outward direct investment (ODI) in SSA is closely linked to trade. Africa’s 
exports to the BICs are dominated by fuels and primary commodities (mainly to China 
and India); the BIC’s exports to African countries are dominated by manufactured 
goods. Chinese FDI can be categorized as resource-efficiency—and market-seeking 
investments.
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After a long history of reliance on trade with and investment from Europe and North 
America, Sub-Saharan African countries are increasingly engaging with other partners, 
during the past decade, Sub-Saharan African countries have increasingly started exploit-
ing new markets, marking what seems to be a historic reorientation of their trade and 
investment toward new partners.
Emerging partners are now a major source and destination of trade with and invest-
ment in Sub-Saharan African countries, and this trend is most likely to accelerate in the 
coming years. Sub-Saharan Africa’s exports with non-traditional partners accounting for 
about 50 % of its total exports and almost 60 % of its total imports during 2010. This 
reorientation is driven mostly by the large economies of Brazil, India, and China (BICs). 
A similar reorientation is also taking place in investment flows, with China account-
ing for 16 % of total foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to the region; other emerging 
countries are also making considerable investments in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The aim of the paper is to analyze the economic impact of Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
engagement with emerging partners throw analyzing the following main Pillars:
I. Theoretical issues: International Cooperation Theory
II. Africa-South cooperation: background
III. The methodology
IV. Reorientation on Sub-Saharan African countries toward new markets
V. Opportunities, challenges and policy implications
Conclusion
Theoretical issues: International Cooperation Theory
The role of BICs in Africa is best analyzed through the optics of international coopera-
tion theory for Africa’s trade with, and investment and aid from the BICs.
The role of trade
The economic literature postulates that an internationally integrated economy offers 
a substantial increase in demand and simultaneously more potential for economies of 
scale than a closed economy. Many studies conclude that trade has a positive effect on 
economic growth.
Trade also helps economies to specialize, increase their resource productivity, raise 
aggregate output, create jobs, generate income and relax foreign exchange restraints. 
Export-led approaches and export promotion lead to high growth, returns to entrepre-
neurial effort increase with exposure to foreign competition.
Trade transmits economic growth through three main channels: economies of scale, 
efficiency gains and the technology cycle. Economies of scale are directly related to the 
monopoly profits in production for niche markets. Efficiency gains are linked to reduced-
cost effects through foreign competition that eventually become evident in a falling rate 
of inflation in the domestic economy. Finally, the technology cycle refers to the growth 
effects that derive from the profitable adoption and application of foreign technologies 
in domestic production processes [Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) 2013:6–7].
Yet Africa must take into account several risks in its trade cooperation with the BICs. 
First, trade-led growth of national output may have little impact on employment and 
development, particularly when most of the trade is in primary commodities with few 
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linkages to the rest of the economy and when many export earnings accrue to foreigners, 
which not only bias the economy in the wrong direction but also reinforce internal and 
external dualities and inequalities. Second, the growth of China and other BICs suggests 
that Africa may find it harder to break into exporting in non-primary commodity sec-
tors as well. However, with wages rising in China-often steeply-new opportunities may 
emerge for African countries (Uma Subramanian and Matthias Matthijs 2007:5).
The role of foreign direct investment
The development literature encompasses several positions on the degree to which FDI 
affects economic growth. One view is that it may affect it directly because it contributes 
to capital accumulation, and the transfer of new technologies to the recipient country. 
Others contend that FDI enhances economic growth indirectly where the direct transfer 
of technology augments the stock of knowledge in the recipient country through labour 
training and skill acquisition, new management practices and organizational arrange-
ments. FDI thus enhances employment in the recipient country via the newly acquired 
skills as well as the management and organizational arrangements often referred to as 
“entrepreneurship” for the host country population [United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 2005a, b:37].
The effects of FDI on economic growth in the host country differ by growth model-
neoclassical or endogenous. With the former, FDI can only affect growth in the short run 
because in the long run, diminishing returns to capital set in. It also postulates that long-
run growth can only arise from both exogenous labour force growth and technological 
progress. Endogenous growth models, in contrast argue that FDI promotes economic 
growth even in the long run through permanent knowledge transfer, as via technology 
spillovers from advanced to lagging countries (Qimiao Fan et al. 2007:74).
The role of development assistance
The theoretical and empirical literature does not reveal an automatic, beneficial impact 
of development assistance on a recipient country: the mode and type of aid as well as 
the country’s socio-economic and political environment are important in enhancing its 
growth impact.
Studies on aid’s impact on growth and development follow four main strands of think-
ing. One group of studies argues that aid has either no effect on growth or even under-
mines it. Generally, they share a view that aid is counterproductive in that it generates 
a low-growth economy where aid dependency expands public spending and wipes out 
domestic savings (Ali Zafar 2007:106–108).
A second set of studies finds an average significant positive impact of aid on growth. 
This set argues that those contending that aid does not enhance growth have only a par-
tial argument, in that aid has supported poverty reduction and growth promotion in 
many countries-thus even if aid has not stimulated growth in all circumstances, on aver-
age it has had a positive effect.
A third group of studies argued that aid has a positive relationship with growth only in 
certain conditions, including the characteristics of both recipient and donor practices, 
while the average effect of aid is close to zero.
Page 4 of 22Elmorsy  Bandung J of Global South  (2016) 3:2 
The fourth set attempted to match aid flows to realistic period over which they could 
influence growth (EAC 2013:8–9).
Africa‑South cooperation: background
Africa’s cooperation with the South is generally of three types. The first form of coop-
eration arrangement is bilateral, between African countries and a developing country in 
another region. For example, it includes, among others, bilateral partnerships between 
Africa and developing countries such as China, India, the Republic of Korea and Turkey. 
The second form of cooperation is trilateral in the sense that it is between an African 
country and two developing countries in different regions. The main cooperation frame-
work in this category is the India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) partnership. The third 
form of cooperation is at the regional level between Africa and other developing country 
regions. The three main cooperation arrangements in this category are the New Asian–
African Strategic Partnership, the Africa–South America Initiative and the Afro–Arab 
Cooperation Initiative (UNCTAD 2010:11) (Fig. 1).
China–Africa partnership
It should be noted that China’s engagement with Africa has evolved over the years, Since 
the 1990s; there have been renewed efforts to strengthen cooperation with the region. This 
began with a visit to the region by Chinese President Jiang Zemin in 1996 where he unveiled 
plans to create the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (UNCTAD 2008:7–9).
The launching of FOCAC in Beijing in 2000 ushered in a new era of relations between 
China and Africa, driven mostly by commercial and economic interests rather than 
political ideology as in the past. The new relationship is also marked by the intensifi-
cation of high-level visits to Africa by Chinese officials as well as an increase in trade, 
finance and investment. The broad priority areas of cooperation identified by China and 
African countries include: political affairs; international affairs, economic and develop-
ment issues; peace and security; and cultural and people-to-people exchanges.
Fig. 1 Africa’s cooperation with the South. Source: UNCTAD 2010. “South–South cooperation: Africa and new 
forms of development partner ship”, economic development of Africa report. New York 12
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FOCAC has become the platform for coordination of China–Africa relations and for 
dialogue between African countries and China. The meetings are held every 3  years 
mostly at the ministerial level, although they are often attended by heads of state and 
government (Viven Foster et al. 2008:1).
There are several interesting and novel features of China’s engagement with Africa that 
are worth emphasizing. First, is that it uses FOCAC as a platform for making pledges 
and commitments to the region. These are usually multi-year commitments and their 
forward-looking nature makes Chinese financial support increasingly predictable. Sec-
ond, FOCAC meetings are used to monitor progress in the implementation of existing 
commitments to Africa. This inbuilt monitoring mechanism increases the likelihood 
that commitments will be fulfilled and has become a model for other Southern partners. 
Third, China has made addressing climate change an important area of its support to the 
region. Fourth, China is increasingly making efforts to integrate the private sector into its 
Africa relations, although the latter is still a passive participant in the FOCAC process.
China’s growing engagement in Africa has generated interest and debate on its contri-
bution to economic and social development in the region. In general, the new partnership 
with Africa has led to closer political and cultural ties between China and Africa. Both 
sides have had frequent exchanges of high-level visits in recent years and provide support 
for each other in multilateral affairs. China has also made contributions to maintenance of 
peace and security in the region. Trade and finance are two key areas where China’s engage-
ment has had very significant impact in the region. China has also contributed to economic 
development in the region through the provision of concessional loans and grants, support 
for infrastructure, generous debt relief, the opening up of its market to Africa goods and 
support for human resource development and medical care (UNCTAD 2010:11–16).
India‑Africa partnership
India has also had close relations with African countries since their independence in 
the 1960s. Until recently, India’s relations with Africa focused more on the provision of 
technical assistance and capacity-building and there was no formal dialogue platform 
for cooperation with the region. In 2008, the Indian Government decided to create a 
new architecture for its engagement with Africa and this led to the convening of the 
First India–Africa Forum Summit in New Delhi from 8–9 April 2008. At the summit, 
India and Africa agreed to enhance cooperation in the following broad areas: econom-
ics; politics; science, research and technology; social development and capacity-building; 
tourism; infrastructure, energy and environment; and media and communication. The 
summit is held every 3 years at the level of heads of state and government.
India’s cooperation with Africa has had positive impact in Africa. There hasbeen a sig-
nificant increase in the volume of trade and investment flows between India and Africa. 
India has also contributed to Africa’s development through loans, debt relief, technical 
assistance, peacekeeping and infrastructure finance (UNCTAD 2005a, b:31).
Brazil–Africa partnerships
Brazil has bilateral cooperation arrangements with individual countries in the region for 
which there is no formal bilateral dialogue platform, and has provided support to them 
through projects in areas such as health, infrastructure and agriculture. Brazil is also key 
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driver of interregional cooperation partnerships between South America and Africa. 
Furthermore, it is active promoters of cooperation among developing countries in multi-
lateral negotiations and reform of the international financial architecture.
Brazil has a unique partnership arrangement with India and South Africa that has 
attracted international attention. The IBSA partnership is a trilateral alliance between Bra-
zil, India and South Africa aimed at boosting their bargaining power and clout on global 
issues and strengthening economic and political ties amongst the three countries. Since 
its inception in 2003, it has become a powerful force in setting the agenda and pace of 
multilateral negotiations. It also plays an important role in ensuring that the concerns and 
interests of developing countries are taken into account in global responses to the financial 
crisis and the reform of the international financial architecture (UNCTAD 2010:16–20).
Methods
Estimation determinates of Sub‑Saharan Africa’s trade intensity with China
1-Brief overview of the gravity model methodology
The gravity model has been widely used to identify determinants of bilateral trade, 
though it is often criticized for lacking a strong theoretical basis. Despite its use in many 
early studies of international trade, the model was considered suspect in that it could not 
easily be shown to be consistent with the dominant Heckscher-Ohlin model explaining 
net trade flows in terms of differential factor endowments. In a typical gravity model, 
bilateral trade flows are determined by the size of the two economies and the distance 
between them. However, it is always possible to expand the model to include other rel-
evant determinants of trade. The following standard gravity model is specified and esti-
mated to examine the potential for Sub-Saharan African’s trade with China:
where T is bilateral trade between country i and j; Y is GDP; YC is GDP per capita and Zi 
and Zj are other relevant variables grouped under “infrastructure” (paved road length as 
per cent of total, number of mobile telephone per 1000 people), policy (FDI in reporting 
countries, tax on international trade in partner country), “cultural and geographic” dis-
tance between the capitals of the trading countries, common official language, sharing 
border, being landlocked) and membership in regional groupings.
Expected signs: β1 and β2 are expected to be positive; β3, β4 and β5 are expected to be 
negative. Infrastructure variables, sharing border and common official language, mem-
bership to a particular REC as well as FDI are expected to be positive, while being land-
locked is expected to be negative (EAC 2010, 392).
According to gravity model, paper designed the following equation to estimate deter-
minates of SSA’s trade Intensity with China.
where:
Yij = bilateral trade between SSA and China (value of exports from SSA to China dur-
ing 2000–2013 in Billion dollars)


















Yij = f(X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9)
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X1 = China Gross Domestic Product (GDP) during 2000–2013, in real constant price 
2000 (100 million Yuan).
X2 = per capita indices of China Gross Demotic Product (during 2000–2013)
X3 = China population (during 2000–2013, 10,000 person)
X4 = length of High ways in China (during 2000–2013, 10,000 km)
X5 = rate of mobile telephone in China (during 2000–2013 sets/100 persons).
X6 = dummy variable about political stability in China, takes one where is apolitical 
stability and takes zero where is apolitical instability(during 2000–2013)
X7 = China FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa (during 2000–2013 in million dollars)
X8 = China average Applied Import MFN Tariff Rates on non-Agricultural and non-
fuel (during 2000–2013)
X9 = dummy variable takes Value of 1 if there is bilateral trade agreements between 
China and Sub-Saharan Africa and takes 0 if there isn’t
2‑Source of data
Paper collected time series data about variables defined in the model, data collected cov-
ered 14 year (2000–2013) from the following reports:
  • UNCTAD hand book of statistics.
  • China statistical year book.
  • Statistical bulletin of China.
3‑Model results and discussion
Detailed results of the model are shown in statistical Appendix; paper concluded that 
the most effective variables that have the major effect on the value of exports of Sub-
Saharan Africa to China were (X5) rate of mobile telephone in China (infrastructure 
variable) and (X7) China FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa because much of China’s outward 
direct investment (ODI) in SSA is closely linked to trade.
Reorientation on Sub‑Saharan African countries toward new markets
After a long history of reliance on trade with and investment from Europe and North 
America, Sub-Saharan African countries are increasingly engaging with other partners, 
including those in their region. This is not unexpected, as emerging markets have main-
tained significantly faster economic growth than advanced economics over the last few 
decades. It is also consistent with the higher natural resource intensity in emerging part-
ners compared with advanced economies and Sub-Saharan Africa’s natural resources 
abundance. As this section describes, emerging partners are now a major source and 
destination of trade with and investment in Sub-Saharan African countries, and this 
trend is most likely to accelerate in the coming years (Harry G. Broadman 2007:84).
1‑Trade
During the past decade, with unprecedented high growth in their exports and imports, 
Sub-Saharan African countries have begun engaging with emerging economies in other 
regions and with other countries within Sub-Saharan Africa.
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This trade reorientation toward new partners is taking place relatively fast, driven 
by increasing trade with a few large emerging markets economics and by intraregional 
trade, in a way that is largely homogenous across the region. Specifically, this trade reori-
entation is:
  • Fast-paced. Between 1990 and 2010, the share of Sub-Saharan Africa’s exports to 
advanced economics declined from 78 to 52 %, and the share of Sub-Saharan Africa’s 
imports from those countries declined from 73 to 43 %. Most of this reorientation has 
occurred during the past 15 years, as the share of both Sub-Saharan Africa’s exports 
to and imports from member countries of the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) declined from 
about 70 % in 2000 to approximately 50 % in 2010. The magnitude of the reorienta-
tion in Sub-Saharan Africa’s trade was not determined solely by oil-related trade, as 
non-oil-exporting Sub-Saharan Africa countries also saw the share of DAC countries 
in their total trade decline by an amount of the same magnitude.
  • Driven mostly by the large emerging economies of Brazil, India and China. By 2010, 
the share of Sub-Saharan Africa trade with Brazil, India, and China reached approxi-
mately 3, 6 and 17 %, respectively, rising from negligible shares in the 1990s [Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) 2011:40–41] (Fig. 2).
All Sub-Saharan African subgroups (oil exporters, low-income countries, middle-
income countries) are exporting a lower share of their products to traditional DAC 
partners than they were in 1990 and all are now exporting more to China. Except for 
oil-exporting countries, all sub-groups have also seen an increase in their share of trade 
to other Sub-Saharan African countries. On the other hand, the reorientation toward 
Brazil and India appears more heterogeneous across subgroups. In regard to imports, all 
subgroups of Sub-Saharan African countries have seen a considerable reduction in their 
imports from traditional DAC partners, and all are increasingly relying on Chinese and 
intraregional imports (IMF 2011:42–43) (Fig. 3).
Sectoral Composition of the Reorientation
Exports
Sub-Saharan Africa exports to BICs are heavily concentrated in primary products, 
mainly oil. By 2008, oil accounted for about 70 % of all Sub-Saharan Africa exports to 
BICs and for more than 80 % of exports if South African exports are excluded. Note that 
Sub-Saharan Africa exports to BICs are more concentrated in oil and gas than exports to 
DAC countries, as Sub-Saharan African countries tend to export more food, beverages, 
and manufactured goods to DAC countries than to BICs (IMF 2011:45) (Fig. 4).
Imports
They are largely machinery, chemicals, and manufactured goods, although there is 
some heterogeneity across trading partners. Sub-Saharan African imports from BICs 
are actually more concentrated in manufactured products-especially from China-than 
is the case with imports from DAC countries, the latter being more focused on imports 
of machinery. Imports from India are more concentrated in machinery and fuel (refined 
oil), and imports from Brazil are most concentrated in food and live animals. Imports 
from the Group of Five are quite diverse, with significant shares for food and live 
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animals, animal and vegetable oils, manufactured goods, and machinery (IMF 2011:46) 
(Fig. 5).
2‑Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
A similar reorientation is occurring in Sub-Saharan Africa’s sources of capital, as emerg-
ing countries such as the BICs, have rapidly increased their investments in the region. 
Chinese FDI to Sub-Saharan Africa, as a share of total FDI to the region, climbed from 
less than 1 % in 2003 to 16 % by 2008. Investment from India is also significant: by 2006, 
Indian investment stocks in Sub-Saharan Africa were almost as large as Chinese FDI 
flows in the region (Viven Foster 2009:4).
Much of China’s outward direct investment (ODI) in SSA is closely linked to trade. 
Official figures from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce suggest that in 2012 ODI to 
SSA reached US $2.52 billion, up from .39 US$ billion in 2005. In 2012 the total stock of 
Chinese ODI was US $20 billion (Fig. 6).
Although most of the emerging partners’ investments are in mining, investments in 
other sectors are also significant. Besides oil and mining, Chinese investment is also 
Fig. 2 Sub-Saharan Africa: total exports and imports by partner. Source: IMF 2011. “Sub Saharan Africa sus-
taining the Expansion”, regional Economic outlook, World Economic and Financial survey. Washington DC, 41
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directed toward manufacturing, construction, finance, agriculture, and service (Miria 
Pigato and Julien Gourdon 2014:16–17) (Fig. 7).
The leading African recipient of FDI from China is South Africa, which has a stock 
of about $3 billion and accounts for nearly 40 per cent of total Chinese FDI stock in the 
region. Other important recipients are Nigeria (with a stock of $796 million), Zambia 
Fig. 3 Sub-Saharan Africa: exports by partner. Source: IMF 2011. “Sub Saharan Africa sustaining the expan-
sion”, regional economic outlook, world economic and financial survey. Washington DC, 43
Fig. 4 Sub-Saharan Africa: exports to BICs by product composition. Source: IMF 2011. “Sub Saharan Africa 
sustaining the expansion”, regional economic outlook, world economic and financial survey. Washington DC, 
45
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($651 million), Sudan ($528 million), Algeria ($509 million), Mauritius($230 million), 
United Republic of Tanzania ($190 million), Madagascar ($147 million), Niger ($137 
million), Congo ($134 million), Egypt ($131 million) and Ethiopia ($127 million).
Historically, Indian FDI in Africa was concentrated in Mauritius. During the period 
1996–2005, accumulated flows to the country reached $1.4 billion, accounting for 9 % of 
total outward FDI from India. More recently, large Indian investment projects have been 
implemented in other countries, such as Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and Sudan.
Fig. 5 Sub-Saharan Africa: imports to BICs by product composition. Source: IMF 2011. “Sub-Saharan Africa 
sustaining the expansion”, regional economic outlook, world economic and financial survey. Washington DC, 
47
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Within Latin America and the Caribbean, Brazil is the most important investor in Africa. 
For instance, Brazilian energy giant Petrobr as has operations in Angola, Libyan Arab Jama-
hiriya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and the United Republic of Tanzania, whereas min-
ing company Vale is present in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Ghana, 
Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia. Other examples of Brazilian investors active in 
Africa are bus maker Marcopolo, which has a plant in South Africa, and conglomerate 
Odebrecht, which primarily has engineering and construction projects in Angola, Djibouti, 
Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Mozambique (UNCTAD 2010:84–88).
3‑Development assistance
According to UNCTAD: Official development assistance (ODA) refers to grants or loans 
to developing countries that: (a) are undertaken by the official sector; (b) have the pro-
motion of economic development and welfare as the main objective; (c) are at conces-
sional financial terms, having a grant element of at least 25 % (UNCTAD 2010:49).
Fig. 6 Chinese outward direct investment to SSA, 2003–2012. Source: Pigato Miria and Julien Gourdon 2014. 
“The impact of rising Chinese trade and development assistance in West Africa” Africa Trade Practice Working 
Paper Series (4). Washington DC: World Bank, 16

























Sectoral Distribuon of China ODI flows in 
2005-s0as
Fig. 7 Sectoral distribution of China ODI flows in 2005–2012. Source: Pigato Miria and Julien Gourdon 2014. 
“The impact of rising Chinese trade and development assistance in West Africa” Africa Trade Practice Working 
Paper Series (4), Washington DC: World Bank, 17
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The contribution of the BICs to development assistance has increased over the last 
decade, with China leading the way. Aid from the BICs (particularly China) promotes 
their trade and investment, but the BICs continue to support Africa’s development 
through project aid-aimed at improving infrastructure-concessionary and soft loans, as 
well as credits and grants. Official flows from the BICs often go to African countries not 
targeted by traditional partners, with concessional loans as China’s main instrument of 
support (ECA 2013:16) (Fig. 8).
Figure 8 shows the relative importance of Chinese ODI and ODA in SSA as a whole. 
The 2009 data are outliers because they include a US $3 billion loan to Ghana, which 
represents about 75 % of total ODA for West Africa. And in 2010 Mauritania accounted 
for 50 % of China’s ODA to West Africa (having received a US $1.3 million loan from 
China). Aside from Ghana and Mauritania, however, the other countries in the region 
receive a relatively small amount of ODA. Chinese assistance is widely distributed 
among different sectors; includes loans and grants for energy, infrastructure, water sup-
ply, sanitation, health, education projects, as well as investments in sports stadiums and 
cultural centers (Miria Pigato and Julien Gourdon 2014:18).
China is the main source of Southern aid to Africa, at 83 per cent of Southern (non-
DAC) flows in 2006, or $2.3 billion, while Brazil pledged an estimated $96.1 million and 
India $11.3 million that year. The Aid data initiative has reported recent official flows 
from Brazil to selected African countries of around $2.9 million (2009); $15.2 million 
from India (2010); and $60.1 million from South Africa (2008). The OECD estimates 
Russia to have disbursed $33.1 million in 2011.
Key features of BICs aid to Africa (particularly China, and to some extent India and 
Brazil) is use of official flows to promote trade and investment. China’s aid to Africa is 
driven largely by its objective of securing access to oil and minerals, and nearly 70 % of 
its infrastructure financing in Africa is concentrated in Angola, Ethiopia, Nigeria and 
Sudan, all of which have oilfields. Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan 
have major oilfields and pay for much of their assistance or loans from China with oil. 
Sudan sends 60 % of its crude oil to China.
Fig. 8 China ODI and ODA flows to SSA. Source: Pigato Miria and Julien Gourdon 2014. “The impact of rising 
Chinese trade and development assistance in West Africa” Africa Trade Practice Working Paper Series (4). 
Washington DC: World Bank, 18
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Another key feature of Southern partners’ support is that official flows target African 
countries seldom reached by traditional partners. The support is increasingly provided 
to countries such as Angola, Sudan and Zimbabwe, while India is known to have pro-
vided support to Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti and Niger. Concessional loans are the 
most widespread instrument of BICs support to African countries. Over 2001–2007, 
half of China’s infrastructure finance to African economies outside North Africa was in 
the form of loans.
Technical cooperation is a key part of BICs countries’ support to Africa (particularly 
from Brazil and India). In 2008 for example, Brazil provided technical assistance through 
the Brazilian Technical Cooperation Agency, of which 43  % of resources for train-
ing went to Africa (Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique and São Tomé 
and Príncipe-have been the main beneficiaries, accounting for 74 % of Brazil’s techni-
cal cooperation to Africa). India, for its part, provides technical assistance through the 
Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation programme, focusing on improving ser-
vices in education, health and ICT (EAC 2013:17–18).
4‑Economic impact of Sub‑Saharan Africa’s engagement with new partners
First, Sub-Saharan Africa’s trade reorientation is the result of an increase in its trade with 
emerging partners, not trade diversion, and therefore the region experiences the benefits 
commonly associated with any expansion in international trade. Second, trading with a 
larger number of partners appears to be reducing the region’s historically high export 
volatility, which could foster its long-term economic growth. Third, emerging partners’ 
financing of Sub-Saharan Africa’s economic activities can help boost economic growth. 
Fourth, growth of emerging partners has an indirect economic benefit for Sub-Saharan 
Africa because it has strengthened commodity prices, thus improving the terms of Sub-
Saharan Africa’s trade with traditional and nontraditional partners (Dieri-Wake Nabine 
2009:21–22).
Fifth the increase in trade prompted by emerging partners fosters specialization along 
comparative advantages, thereby boosting productivity and output. By increasing econo-
mies of scale, trade with emerging partners lowers Sub-Saharan Africa’s costs of pro-
duction and increases the variety of goods available, which is particularly important for 
most small Sub-Saharan African countries with small middle classes. Sub-Saharan Afri-
ca’s exports to new partners also benefit the region dynamically through technological 
transfer and the related learning by doing impact on economic growth (Marteus Brack-
ner and Daniel Lederman 2012:20).
Sixth the economic impact of FDI from emerging partners on Sub-Saharan African 
countries goes beyond higher foreign exchange reserves and potentially higher tax reve-
nues. FDI in manufacturing (for example, in Ghana, Mauritius, and Nigeria, among oth-
ers), agriculture (including food processing), and tourism fosters productivity growth in 
the region through technology transfer.
Also important are investments in financial services, because financial development is 
linked to higher long-term growth.
Seventh most important, emerging partners’ financing of infrastructure (which is 
often associated with large-scale FDI), mainly from China, is particularly effective in 
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improving competitiveness in such an infrastructure deprived region as Sub-Saharan 
Africa (IMF 2011:52–57).
Opportunities, challenges and policy implications
1‑Opportunities
Engagement with emerging partners raises opportunities for sub-Saharan African coun-
tries as follows:
  • Outsourcing of economic activities to Sub-Saharan Africa. Rising wages in Brazil, 
China, India, and other countries could prompt them to further outsource their eco-
nomic activities to Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in light manufacturing. The BICs 
are increasingly moving up the value chain (for instance, China and India in man-
ufacturing, and Brazilin biofuels) with the potential to outsource these activities to 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Globalre balancing between advanced and emerging economies 
could accelerate this process, with more rapid industry upgrading in China and India.
  • Low-cost inputs and consumption goods. Sub-Saharan Africa stands to benefit from 
imports available at a much lower cost from emerging partners than from traditional 
partners. Low-cost capital goods boost the productivity of Sub-Saharan Africa’s pro-
ducers, whereas low-cost manufactured imports benefit consumers and producers 
(through lower wage pressures and cheaper inputs).
  • Access to more appropriate technologies. Through intensifying trade and investment 
relationships with other developing countries, countries in the region also have 
access to cheaper and less-sophisticated technologies that may be more appropriate 
for their level of development.
  • Economic benefits from intraregional integration. Intraregional integration could also 
boost growth by promoting horizontal FDI, creating economies of scale and improv-
ing the allocation of factors of production within the region (Stephen N. Karingi and 
Unicent Leyaro 2009:35).
2‑Challenges
The increasing engagement with emerging partners also poses a number of challenges:
  • Natural resource curse. Because the region’s trade relationship with larger emerging 
partners is overwhelmingly concentrated on exports of raw commodities, inadequate 
management of natural resource wealth could lead to many of the economic prob-
lems commonly associated with natural resource dependence. Sub-Saharan African 
countries have experienced these problems for decades: crowding out of higher-
value-added activities, pro cyclical macroeconomic policy, an unsustainably rapid 
depletion of resources, and high volatility in terms of trade.
  • Transitional costs. Increasing trade with new partners has resulted in a reallocation 
of factors of production and consequent transitional costs, such as failing businesses 
and higher unemployment. For instance, non-commodity sectors such as manufac-
turing or food processing can be negatively affected by lower cost imports from other 
countries (for example, manufactured products from China or processed food from 
Brazil) and from currency appreciation resulting from higher commodity exports.
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  • Rapid structural changes. The growing engagement of Sub-Saharan African countries 
with emerging partners and their ongoing economic rise will most likely continue 
to bring substantial changes to the supply of and demand for Sub-Saharan African 
products. High economic growth in emerging economies may further boost com-
modity prices, and higher wages in manufacturing and services in emerging partners 
may prompt them to outsource some of their activities to Sub-Saharan Africa. At 
the same time, new technologies may affect the integration of production processes 
between Sub-Saharan Africa and emerging partners. Such changes may be as strong 
and far-reaching as the recent commodity prices boom and could prove very hard for 
Sub-Saharan Africa entrepreneurs and governments to anticipate (IMF 2011:59–60).
3‑Policy implications
Recommendations for African countries
a. Main stream South–South cooperation into national development strategies. Afri-
can countries should adopt a well-defined strategy for South–South cooperation to 
ensure that it furthers rather than hinders the achievement of national and regional 
development goals.
b. Take a proactive approach to the partnership process. The scale and scope of interac-
tion between African countries and developing countries partners has expanded rap-
idly in the last 15 years. A proactive approach by African governments and sharing of 
experiences with developing country partners will accelerate mutual policy learning, 
which should enhance the effectiveness of interactions for both parties.
c. Ensure that cooperation with developing countries complements existing partner-
ships with developed countries.
d. Involve more local stakeholders in partnerships with the South. To ensure effec-
tive national ownership of the process and outcomes of the evolving partnerships 
between Africa and developing countries, African governments should make efforts 
to get parliaments, the private sector and civil society more involved in the process.
e. Strengthen efforts to develop productive capacities. This requires public and private 
investment, structural transformation and the development of productive capaci-
ties. The current pattern of trade with developing countries is reinforcing commodity 
dependence and replicating the existing pattern of trade with traditional partners. 
African countries should reverse this export pattern and transform the structure of 
their economies. This requires improving the business environment, addressing the 
problem of poor infrastructure, enhancing access to credit and transfer of skills and 
technology (David Dollar 2008:5–7).
f. Enhance capacity to negotiate and benefit from the multilateral trading system.
g. Play a more active role in coordination of support from partners. To reduce transaction 
costs and increase the development impact. In this regard, there is a need to develop or 
strengthen existing national aid management and coordination frameworks to enhance 
local ownership of aid processes and outcomes (Ali Zafar 2010:14–17).
h. Avoid accumulation of unsustainable debt. African countries should ensure that new 
borrowing from developing country partners is used to finance projects that enhance 
domestic capacity to repay. There is also the need to pay more attention to the struc-
ture as well as management of external debt to avoid a debt crisis.
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i. Adopt a developmental approach in seeking foreign direct investment. African coun-
tries should recognize that ultimately the most effective way to attract FDI is to have 
a dynamic and growing domestic private sector. If they wish to attract market-seek-
ing or efficiency-seeking FDI, instead of resource-seeking FDI,they have to create a 
growing and efficient domestic market coupled with a policy environment attractive 
to both domestic and foreign investors. In this regard, the focus of African countries 
should not be on attracting Southern FDI per se, rather it should be on creating link-
ages between FDI and the domestic economy and also directing it to sectors where it 
can catalyze domestic investment, create employment, spur regional integration and 
boost productive capacity (UNCTAD 2014:87) (UNCTAD 2010:102–104).
Recommendations for developing country partners
a. Broaden the scope of engagement to include sectors other than the extractive indus-
tries.
b. Strengthen support for regional integration in Africa.
c. Enlarge country coverage.
d. Provide more information on development activities in the region.
e. Ensure that projects have positive impact on the environment.
f. Address the transactions costs associated with the multiplicity of partnership initia-
tives (Corinne Delechat 2009:27).
Recommendations for developed country partners
a. Provide more support for Africa–South cooperation.
b. Strengthen dialogue with Southern partners (UNCTAD 2009: 95).
Recommendations for regional and multilateral institutions
a. Coordinate the development of statistics and collection of information on Africa–
South cooperation.
b. Provide more research support.
c. Establish financing facilities for Africa–South cooperation (UNCTAD 2010:105–
108).
Conclusion
Trade between the BICs and Africa can be summarized under three key features: Afri-
ca’s exports to the BICs are dominated by fuels and primary commodities (mainly to 
China and India); the BIC’s exports to African countries are dominated by manufactured 
goods; and although some African countries will gain, some will lose.
Chinese FDI can be categorized as resource-efficiency—and market-seeking invest-
ments. The policy upshot of the first type is that African economies need to invest their 
gains from primary commodity exports in downstream, higher value added industries, 
which should allow the continent’s natural-resource exporters to develop and diversify 
their export base, so moving from dependence on natural resource exports.
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The equivalent policy implication for China’s efficiency-seeking investments is that 
African governments should help such investors to forge linkages with local African 
domestic producers, thereby producing sustainable exports for African economies with 
higher domestic value added, which should strengthen domestic businesses. The policy 
challenge for African governments with market-seeking investments is to ensure that 
domestic suppliers perform acceptably on price, delivery and service quality.
African governments should also enhance the benefits of market- or efficiency-seek-
ing Chinese FDI by ensuring the outsourcing of their activities to local entrepreneurs; 
increasing local sourcing of inputs for production; and ensuring the employment of local 
workers under fair labour practices.
Official flows from the BICs are a small portion of ODA to Africa; some of the aid 
from the BICs (particularly China) promotes trade and investment; ODA from the BICs 
often benefits African countries not targeted by traditional partners; concessional loans 
are China’s main instrument; and technical cooperation is crucial in education, health 
and ICT, particularly from Brazil and India.
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Appendix
Gravity model variables
y X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 X8 X9
4.50 99,214.60 107.60 127,643.00 167.98 2.20 1.00 61.00 15.90 1.00
4.80 107,449.70 107.50 127,627.00 169.80 2.71 1.00 63.00 14.70 1.00
5.40 117,208.30 108.40 128,453.00 176.52 7.76 1.00 65.00 12.50 1.00
8.40 128,958.90 109.30 129,227.00 180.98 12.20 1.00 68.00 10.60 1.00
16.60 141,964.50 109.40 129,988.00 187.07 17.14 1.00 152.00 9.80 1.00
21.10 158,020.70 110.70 130,756.00 334.52 20.63 1.00 201.00 9.20 1.00
28.80 208,381.00 112.00 131,448.00 345.70 22.64 1.00 362.00 9.10 1.00
36.40 237,892.80 113.60 132,129.00 385.37 22.76 1.00 1297.00 9.20 1.00
56.00 260,812.00 109.10 132,802.00 373.02 20.98 1.00 5480.00 8.90 1.00
43.30 28,484,408.00 108.70 133,450.00 386.08 20.40 1.00 1233.00 8.90 1.00
67.10 314,602.50 109.90 134,091.00 400.82 19.45 1.00 1350.00 8.90 1.00
93.20 438,853.00 108.80 134,735.00 410.64 18.41 1.00 2300.00 8.90 1.00
102.50 472,436.50 107.10 135,404.00 423.75 17.40 1.00 3200.00 8.90 1.00
19.70 503,217.90 107.10 136,072.00 435.62 16.41 1.00 4500.00 8.90 1.00
Regression 
Notes
Output created 07-May-2015 19:03:23
Comments
Input Data




N of rows in working Data file 14
Page 19 of 22Elmorsy  Bandung J of Global South  (2016) 3:2 
Missing value handling Definition of missing User-defined missing values are 
treated as missing.
Cases used Statistics are based on cases with 
no missing values for any variable 
used.
Syntax REGRESSION
/DESCRIPTIVES MEAN STDDEV CORR 
SIG N
/MISSING LISTWISE
/STATISTICS COEFF OUTS BCOV R 
ANOVA COLLIN TOL CHANGE ZPP
/CRITERIA = PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
/NOORIGIN
/DEPENDENT y
/METHOD = ENTER x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 
x7 x8 x9
/RESIDUALS DURBIN
Resources Processor time 00:00:00.02
Elapsed time 00:00:00.02
Memory required 8272 bytes




For models with dependent variable y, the following variables are constants or have 
missing correlations: x6, x9. They will be deleted from the analysis.
Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Deviation N
y 36.2714 32.45,521 14
x1 2,262,387.1714 7,548,493.84,088 14
x2 109.2286 1.86689 14
x3 131,701.7857 2853.01334 14
x4 312.7050 108.73762 14
x5 15.7921 6.93553 14
x6 1.0000 .00000 14
x7 1452.2857 1787.10365 14
x8 10.3143 2.34549 14
x9 1.0000 .00000 14
Correlations
y x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9
Pearson correlation
 y 1.000 .076 −.040 .772 .745 .524 – .544 −.593 –
 x1 .076 1.000 −.086 .194 .210 .200 – −.022 −.185 –
 x2 −.040 −.086 1.000 −.033 .181 .603 – −.256 −.383 –
 x3 .772 .194 −.033 1.000 .944 .688 – .740 −.801 –
 x4 .745 .210 .181 .944 1.000 .771 – .685 −.795 –
 x5 .524 .200 .603 .688 .771 1.000 – .393 −.945 –
 x6 – – – – – – 1.000 – – –
 x7 .544 −.022 −.256 .740 .685 .393 – 1.000 −.495 –
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y x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9
 x8 −.593 −.185 −.383 −.801 −.795 −.945 – −.495 1.000 –
 x9 – – – – – – – – – 1.000
Sig. (1-tailed)
 y .398 .446 .001 .001 .027 .000 .022 .013 .000
 x1 .398 – .385 .253 .236 .247 .000 .471 .263 .000
 x2 .446 .385 – .455 .268 .011 .000 .189 .088 .000
 x3 .001 .253 .455 – .000 .003 .000 .001 .000 .000
 x4 .001 .236 .268 .000 – .001 .000 .003 .000 .000
 x5 .027 .247 .011 .003 .001 – .000 .082 .000 .000
 x6 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 – .000 .000 .000
 x7 .022 .471 .189 .001 .003 .082 .000 – .036 .000
 x8 .013 .263 .088 .000 .000 .000 .000 .036 – .000
 x9 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 –
N
 y 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
 x1 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
 x2 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
 x3 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
 x4 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
 x5 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
 x6 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
 x7 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
 x8 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
 x9 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Variables entered/removed
Model Variables entered Variables removed Method
1 x8, x1, x2, x7, x4, x3, x5a – Enter
Dependent variable: y
a All requested variables entered.
Model summary









F change df1 df2 Sig. F 
change
1 .801a .641 .222 28.62158 .641 1.531 7 6 .310 1.512
a Predictors: (constant), x8, x1, x2, x7, x4, x3, x5
Dependent variable: y
ANOVA
Model Sum of squares df Mean square F Sig.
1 Regression 8778.258 7 1254.037 1.531 .310a
Residual 4915.170 6 819.195
Total 13,693.429 13
Dependent variable: y
a Predictors: (constant), x8, x1, x2, x7, x4, x3, x5
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Coefficients






t Sig. Correlations Collinearity 
statistics







1 (Constant) −143.836 3033.684 −.047 .964
x1 −9.234E−007 .000 −.215 −.693 .514 .076 −.272 −.169 .622 1.607
x2 −8.287 12.471 −.477 −.665 .531 −.040 −.262 −.163 .116 8.601
x3 .007 .017 .606 .399 .704 .772 .161 .098 .026 38.491
x4 .084 .395 .280 .212 .839 .745 .086 .052 .034 29.287
x5 4.380 8.049 .936 .544 .606 .524 .217 .133 .020 49.459
x7 .005 .008 .272 .598 .572 .544 −.237 −.146 .289 3.462
x8 8.893 20.876 .643 .426 .685 −.593 .171 .104 .026 38.048
Dependent variable: y
Coefficient correlations
Model x8 x1 x2 x7 x4 x3 x5
1 Correlations x8 1.000 −.226 −.290 −.187 −.588 .626 .899
x1 −226 1.000 .550 .461 −.143 .109 −.391
x2 −.290 .550 1.000 .527 −.289 .363 −.616
x7 −.187 .461 .527 1.000 −.174 .000 −.305
x4 −.588 −.143 −.289 −.174 1.000 −.919 −.428
x3 .626 .109 .363 .000 −.919 1.000 .362
x5 .899 −.391 −.616 −.305 −.428 .362 1.000
Covariances x8 435.821 −6.287E−006 −75.503 −.032 −4.852 .226 151.009
x1 −6.287E−006 1.877E−012 9.140E−006 5.083E−009 −7.509E−008 2.504E−009−4.194E−006
x2 −75.503 9.140E−006 155.515 .054 −1.422 .078 −61.804
x7 −.032 5.083E−009 .054 6.831E−005 −.001 2.462E−008−.020
x4 −4.852 −7.509E−008 −1.422 −.001 .156 −.006 −1.361
x3 .226 2.504E−009 .078 2.462E−008 −.006 .000 .050











x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x7 x8
1 1 6.353 1.000 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
2 .902 2.654 .00 .61 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
3 .576 3.321 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .21 .00
4 .150 6.508 .00 .05 .00 .00 .00 .01 .16 .00
5 .017 19.351 .00 .03 .00 .00 .15 .03 .26 .00
6 .002 55.841 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .18 .04 .28
7 3.524E−005424.620 .00 .24 .62 .09 .10 .76 .29 .51
8 4.002E−0061259.966 1.00 .07 .38 .91 .74 .02 .03 .21
Dependent variable: y
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Residuals Statistics
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N
Predicted value 1.1063 76.2000 36.2714 25.98559 14
Residual −51.30946 27.89357 .00000 19.44454 14
Std. predicted 
value
−1.353 1.537 .000 1.000 14
Std. residual −1.793 .975 .000 .679 14
Dependent variable: y
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